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Effect of IRC Code 1031 on Texas Agricultural Land Price
By Beom Su Park, James W. Richardson, Ph.D., and Charles J. Gilliland, Ph.D.
IRC code 1031 (Section 1031) allows land owners to sell real property without capital gains tax
when they buy so-called “like-kind” properties within 45 days. To defer capital gains taxes, sellers
must find the replacement properties in a short period, thus increasing the demand for like-kind
properties. In general, the Section 1031 tax provision has an affect on the demand and supply of
land and will result in a land market price change.
Colwell and Dehring (2001) suggested the analytical framework to compare the benefits of
Section 1031 tax deferred simultaneous exchanges with the benefits of taxable delayed
exchanges. However, there were few studies quantifying the affect of Section 1031 on land
market price.
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the effect
of Section 1031 tax deferred
payment on Texas agricultural land
price. To analyze the effects, we
estimate the market equilibrium
price function using the dynamic
panel model and Texas agricultural
land sales for 1965-2007. We argue
that Section 1031 increases both
demand and supply of agricultural
land by its tax reducing effect. Our
empirical estimation shows that
Section 1031 decreases the market
price which means the supply curve
shifted to the right more than the
demand curve. 
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contributed to increased land price. They argued that especially for
business property, the expected capital gains would be increased by
Section 1031 by deferring tax payments, and those capital gains affects
would increase the land price (Holmes and Slade 2001, and Ling and
Petrova 2008). Holmes and Slade (2001) showed tax deferred
simultaneous exchanges of properties increased the market value of
the properties. They found that sellers of properties are willing to pay
a risk premium for buying replacement properties in 45 days to defer
capital gains taxes, when they analyzed the Phoenix apartment market
cases using a hedonic regression method. Ling and Petrova (2008) got
similar results from apartment and office building transactions for 15
cities. They argued that the exchangers need to pay a premium since
the U.S. commercial real estate market is not perfect and it is not easy
to find replacement properties in 45 days. However, the above two
studies focused on the demand. Hedonic regression is usually used to
evaluate market demand. So their models and results did not reflect
the effects of Section 1031 on the supply side. In addition, they used
the urban real estate (apartment, office) market sales data. The results
for farmland may be different.Helmers, Shaik, and Atwood (2008)
described two possibilities of the Section 1031 effects on land prices.
First, many land owners who sell land try to find replacement land, so
the demand for land increases as well as the price of land. Second, in a
competitive market, the tax reduction by Section 1031 will cause a
decrease in the observed supply price since the supply price will
change from Ps +  tax to  Ps. They argued that if the increase in
demand price is not substantial enough to offset the decrease in
supply price, the equilibrium price will go down. Moreover, they
showed the empirical result of negative price effects for Section 1031
for Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South
Dakota.
The present study examines the effect of Section 1031 on the price of
agricultural land in Texas. Whether the effect would be positive or
negative is investigated by estimating the market equilibrium land
price function. Moreover, we will develop the empirical model using
the dynamic panel data analysis method with county level panel data
in Texas. This method will be used because it will give consistent and
more efficient estimators of the market equilibrium price function.
1
Theoretical Model
Market price of land is determined by demand and supply. So, the
effect of Section 1031 on Texas farmland price can be measured by the
net effects of changes on the demand and supply for Texas farmland.
We can expect the effect of Section 1031 on land supply will be
positive since the seller can defer the capital gains tax. Also, the effect
on land demand is expected to be positive as the buyer (the future
seller) can expect to get more future capital gains.
In Figure 1, the demand and supply curve without Section 1031 are
given by DD=0 and SD=0. The equilibrium price without Section
1031 is E0. When Section 1031 is applied, the supply curve shifts
from SD=0 to SD=1. If the demand curve shifts exactly the same
amount as the supply curve, equilibrium changes from E0 to E2, and
price will not change (P0=P2). If the demand curve shifts less, D1,
price falls to P1. If the demand curve shifts more, D3, price rises to P3.
Thus, the sign of the price change caused by Section 1031 depends on
the relative changes of the demand and supply curves caused by
Section 1031.
To analyze the effects of Section 1031 on Texas farmland price, we
must specify the supply and demand for Texas farmland.
Supply for agricultural land
We can assume that land owners who want to sell land try to maximize
their total net benefit (TNB) from selling land. Their supply decision
will be (see the appendix for details):
(1)  
where Acret
s is the supplied quantity (total acres sold at the year t), Pt
is sale price, P0 is the initial price the land owner paid, (Pt -P0)×Acre
is capital gains, t is tax rate of capital gains, t(1-D) is the Section 1031
effect
2 (D=1 if Section 1031 is applied, otherwise 0), and t(1-D)(Pt -
P0)Acre is the tax payment for the capital gains with Section 1031
effect.  FI is farm income per acre from the land, PI is non-farm
personal income per acre from owning the land, L(r) is the expected
loan for the replacement land per acre, and r is interest rate for land
loans, so r*L(r)*acre is the expected interest costs of a loan for buying
replacement land. We can expect Acre supplied to be positively
correlated with price as in a usual supply curve, and Section 1031
dummy also will be positively correlated with Acre since if D=1, the
marginal benefit increases so both Acre and price increase. If the non
farm personal income (PI)
3, the expected future incomes (FI
e, PI
e),
and the expected future price (PT
e) are high, the opportunity cost of
selling the land now is high, so we can assume they are negatively
correlated with the land supply. Expected prices are unobservable so
one year lagged prices are used as a proxy for expected prices in the
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significant for the supply decision (Richardson, et al, 2009), so we
cannot assume whether the effect of farm income on the agricultural
land supply will be positive or not. Capital gains tax rate t can be
assumed to be negative because marginal cost of selling the land
increases as the tax rate goes up.
Demand for agricultural land
If we assume the single market specification (partial equilibrium
model) without any constraints, the buyers demand decision will be:
(2)    
where PT
e is the expected price when the buyer sells the land in the
future. (PT
e-Pt)×Acre is the expected capital gain, L(r) is the loan per
acre to buy land, and r×L(r)×Acre is the interest costs. For the
demand equation, Pt is expected to be negatively related with Acre as
general demand relationship. The FI
e, PI
e, and PT
e can be positively
related with Acre since if FI
e, PI
e and PT
e increase, marginal benefit is
expected to increase, and r is negatively related with Acre because as r
rises the marginal cost of buying land increases. If Section 1031 is
applied,  D=1, expected capital gains increase, so D and  Acre are
positively related. Capital gains tax rate t is expected to be negatively
related because expected future gains from selling the land in the
future will decrease if tax rate increases.
Market equilibrium price
Consequently, we can derive the market equilibrium price from the
equilibrium condition for supply and demand,
(3)
So, we can conclude the effect of Section 1031 (D) on Pt will be
decided by the relative effect of demand and supply. D is a dummy
variable that when changed from 0 to 1, both the demand curve and
supply curve will shift to the right. If the supply curve shifts more, the
price will fall, and if the demand curve shifts more, the price will rise. 
The effect of rand ton the equilibrium price is also determined by the








To estimate equation (3), the agricultural land transaction data for
parcels of 10 or more acres for each county in Texas from 1965 to
2007 will be used. Farm income and non-farm personal income level
of each county are not available, so the annual real farm income per
farm household and real non-farm personal earnings per capita for
Texas are used as proxy variables. The income data were obtained
from USDA/ERS and USC/Bureau of Economic Analysis. Mortgage
interest rates were obtained from the Dallas Federal Reserve Board.
Capital gains tax rates are different by seller’s owning years and
marginal income tax rates. The top rate for capital gains will be used
as a representative tax rate for each year. The tax rate data were
obtained from CTJ (Citizens for Tax Justice).
4
Model and Method
To do empirical estimation of equation (3), first we should specify the
functional forms of demand and supply. Here, we used the log-log
specification since the correlations between dependent and
independent variables for log-log specification are clearer than those
for no-log specification. Also, log-log specification is easier to handle
and yields elasticities directly. We use lagged variables on the right
hand side as the proxy for expected prices hypothesized in the model
(see Appendix). The lag lengths are decided based on the significance
of their coefficients. If the coefficient of a lagged variable is not
significant, we don’t include it as an explanatory variable. So the
empirical model will be (see Appendix for details):
(4)    
The characteristics of each county, chrti, depends on the
characteristics of the land such as the distance from metropolitan area,
the quality of soil, and so on. We assume these variables  are not time
varying. Some county values can change over time, but time varying
characteristics can be explained by FI, PI, acre, or P. So, chrt means
only time constant effects in this model associated with price.
We did not consider the interaction effects of Section 1031 dummy
variable D80 with other explanatory variables except interest rate r,
because tax deferment is only an income increasing effect and
expected not to change demand/supply elasticities. However, we took
the interaction with interest rate into account since individuals can
change their demand/supply response to interest rate if income
changes.
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are unobservable, and the equation (4) has dynamic properties (it
includes lagged dependent variables on the right hand side). To
overcome the problems, some mathematical and econometrical
manipulations are needed on equation (4). We will apply “dynamic
panel model analysis” which was suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 reports parameter estimates for equation (4), the empirical
model. All of the parameters are statistically significant. The pricet-5,
acre tradedt-2, farm incomet-3, personal incomet-1, and older historical
information are found to be not significant, so they were excluded in
the model. The R
2 is 0.8607, thus this model is revealed to fit
historical data well as we see in Figure 2. The results of the price
equilibrium model estimated for equation (4) are explained below.
The elasticity of personal income is positive as expected, but that of
farm income in the current period is negative. The coefficient
estimates of lnFIit and lnPIit are -0.0197 and 0.7801, respectively.
From these results, we can confirm that the market price is more
sensitive to non-farm personal income in the current period than to
farm income in the current period. Traditional agricultural economics
theory puts more emphasis on farm income. However, recent studies
by Hardie, Narayan, and Gardner (2001), Richardson, et al (2009),
and Gilliland (2003, 2005) showed that the non-farm income such as
agricultural recreational use and capital investment uses are more
important than farm income in explaining prices of farmland. The
empirical results in this study are consistent with the results of these
studies.  
The farmland prices in t-1 to t-4, acres traded in t and t-1, farm
income in t-1 and t-2, ln(acreit), ln(acreit-1), ln(FIit-1), ln(FIit-2) are




e). The elasticity estimates of price in t-1 to t-4 are 0.3643, 0.1631,
0.1208, 0.0496, respectively. These results show that demanders build
up their price expectation based on historical farmland price series.
Also, the results show that buyers and sellers put more emphasis on
recent price information than past information, as indicated by the
greater elasticity for pricet-1 than pricet-2 and older lagged prices.
The estimated coefficients of transaction volume (acres sold in the
county) (Acret and Acret-1) are -0.1384, 0.0189, respectively. The
negative coefficient of Acret indicates that the model is consistent
with supply and demand theory, i.e., that as the number of acres
offered for sale increases price falls. Inversely, when acres sold was
large last year, the prices tend to fall in the current year.
The coefficient estimates of past farm income in t-1 and  t-2 are,
respectively, 0.0974, 0.1171. As we expected, the effects of past farm
income on farmland price is positive since higher farm income
increases the farmland price.
5 The results show that the effect of farm
income two years ago is significant, but past personal (non-farm)
income was not significant.  This means that lagged personal income
data are not necessary to explain farmland prices because the time
series of PI is so stable. In addition, the farm income data last year are
not fully informative enough, so farm income data two years ago are
needed for buyers of agricultural to develop their farmland price
expectations. Figure 3 shows that the time series of farm income are
more volatile than personal income, which supports the econometric
results that lagged farm income is needed to explain farmland prices. 
The coefficient estimate for the Section 1031 dummy variable D80 is
-1.5775. By this result, we can confirm the effect of Section 1031 on
agricultural land prices in Texas is negative. The theoretical model
says a land price decrease would occur if the supply shifts to the right
more than the demand, which appears to be the case for Texas
agricultural land. The seller’s benefits from Section 1031 can be
realized only after selling the land, thus the 1031 exchange provision
provides an incentive to increase supply. However, the buyer’s benefits
from Section 1031 would be realized in the future, and therefore the
gains are uncertain. As a result, the supply of Texas agricultural land
shifts to the right more than the demand shifts, as indicated by the
-1.5775 coefficient for D80 in Table 1. These results agree with results
Helmers, Shaik, and  Atwood (2008) reported for Midwest states. 
The coefficients for the mortgage interest rate rt and D80× rt are
estimated to be -7.6316 and 11.9439. In general it is considered that
high interest rates decrease demand for land by pushing up buying
costs, and so it lowers market price. This is confirmed by the negative
coefficient of rt -7.6316. However, the results in this study show the
effect of the interest rate after Section 1031 is positively (-
7.6316+11.9439=4.3123) related to farmland price. The explanation
is that before Section 1031 sellers were not as concerned about
interest rate; interest rate was the buyer’s concern. With Section 1031
exchanges, the sellers are also buyers, so now both buyers and sellers
are sensitive to interest rates. If the sum of the coefficients for rt and
D80× rt is greater than zero, the supply curve for Texas agricultural
land shifted to the right (increased) more than the demand curve,
From SD=0 to SD1 and E0 to E1 in Figure 1.
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changes since 1965 have reduced farmland values. The results suggest
that a one percent increase in the capital gains income tax rate reduces
Texas farmland values by 0.4 percent.  Lower farmland prices are a
result of lower capital gain tax rates (and exclusions in some years)
which encouraged sellers to increase the supply of farmland as land
owners expected a smaller loss of the sales price due to taxes. 
The equilibrium model for farmland prices estimated here combines
the forces that affect both supply and demand, making the results
more robust than traditional studies that have attempted to explain
farmland price using a conventional single equation models.  The
model is able to sort out the net effects of variables that shift both
supply and demand.  A case in point is current year’s farm income is
less important than non-farm personal income in explaining farmland
prices.  In a market where farm income is rather risky multiple year
lags of farm income are necessary to capture the effects of this variable
on farmland prices. Another factor in Texas that contributed to the
results of the model is that the majority of farmland sales are to non-
farmers who are purchasing land for recreational pursuits.
6 The
equilibrium model captures the market’s price movements associated
with the number of acres being traded.  The model indicates that an
increase in acres sold (supplied) causes prices to decrease, as economic
theory would indicate.  Another interesting result is that interest rates
affected farmland prices differently before and after 1031 exchanges.
Interest rates had a smaller and negative impact on farmland price
prior to 1031 exchanges and a larger and positive impact after the
exchanges were permitted.  With the opportunity to do a 1031
exchange sellers became buyers of land so high interest rates reduced
the supply of farmland on the market and strengthened prices.  The
dummy variable used to test if the supply of land increased more than
the demand was highly significant and indicated that supply did
increase more than demand after the 1031 exchanges were permitted.
In any market when supply outpaces demand the equilibrium price
will fall. One explanation of this supply and demand shift is that many
1031 exchanges involve selling farmland in the way of urban
development at very high prices and acquiring farmland in more
remote locations where the price per acre is much lower.  The effect is
likely to be a price reduction in the selling area (near population
centers) while the positive effect on demand for land will be smaller
and would be felt in more remote regions with fewer sales.  By
capturing the supply and demand forces at work we have been able to
isolate the effects of a structural shift in the Texas farmland market
caused by the 1031 exchange provision in the income tax code.
Summary and Conclusion
Theoretically, the effect of Section 1031 on farmland values is
determined by both demand and supply shifts caused by land
transactions taking advantage of Section 1031 exchanges. To detect
the effect of Section 1031 on farmland prices in Texas this study
estimates the market equilibrium price function related to tax reforms
in Section 1031. The empirical results verify that the effect is to
reduce agricultural land price in Texas. These results are consistent
with Helmers, Shaik and Atwood’s (2008) analysis of farmland in
Nebraska and other Plains states.
The reason for the negative effect on price is inferred by the difference
between supply shifts and demand shifts. The supply curve shifts to
the right more by Section 1031 than the demand curve, and
equilibrium price point moves from E0→E1 in Figure 1.  Many forces
in the Texas farmland market can help explain these shifts.  The
majority of farmland buyers are purchasing farmland for
recreational/non-consumptive purposes. Non-farm income is driving
these purchases more than farm incomes. Large developers have, until
recently, been purchasing large ranches to subdivide them into more
affordable parcels for consumers wanting a rural residence/recreation
experience.  So demand shifts have been more responsive to non-farm
income in the near term.  Supply shifts have been in part driven by the
sale of high priced farmland near urban development and the breakup
of large parcels in rural areas of the state; these types of sales are
facilitated by 1031 exchange provisions.
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1 See Wooldridge (“Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data” chapter 12, 2002), Blundell and Bond (1998)
2 We assume the case that capital gains tax is fully reduced when Section 1031 is applied.
3 Richardson, et al (2009) reported that, “The elasticity of price per acre with respect to personal income has ranged between 0.353 in
1990-1994 and 1.160 in 2000-2004.  The elasticity of price per acre with respect to net farm income peaked at 0.267 in 2000-2004.
Personal income is several magnitudes more important than net farm income in determining rural land values in Texas.”  For this reason
non-farm income for Texas is included in both the supply and demand equations.
4 Available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf
5 The model is suggesting that a longer term trend on farm income is necessary to explain prices of farmland.  The current year’s coefficient
on farm income is -0.019 but the lagged farm income variables in t-1 and t-2 have coefficients of 0.097 and 0.117, respectively. The effects
of the lagged farm income variables far outweigh the effect of current farm income. An explanation is that farm incomes are quite risky in
Texas and a trend in farm income is more important to land prices than the current year’s farm income level.  See Figure 3 for a
comparison of risk for farm income and non-farm personal income.
6 A survey as to Texas farmland buyer motives reported that 67 percent of the respondents named recreation (hunting and fishing) as a very
important motive among buyers in the 2001 land market (Tierra Grande).  Agricultural production was named by only 15 percent of
respondents falling well short of the percent that saw non-consumptive recreation as a very important motive.  1031 exchange had not
emerged as the force it would exert later with only 9 percent seeing it as a very important buyer motive.
7 The most important tax reform related with Section 1031 is traced to 1979, so we use 1980 as the changing point. Helmers, Shaik, and
Atwood also use 1980 as their break point.
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Figure 1.  The effect of Section 1031 on farmland price
Figure 1.  Texas average farmland price 1972-20072010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Figure 1.  Texas farm income and personal income 1965-20072010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 1.  The empirical results for estimating impacts of Section 1031 on Texas agricultural land prices2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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